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I. Introduction
Only about half of the U.S. private-sector workforce is currently covered by an employersponsored retirement plan, a fact that has sparked debate over whether there is a national
“retirement crisis.” 1 In response, a growing number of states has mandated that private-sector firms
offer retirement saving accounts to their employees. 2 Oregon was among the first, passing a bill in
2015 launching the mandatory OregonSaves program, which is structured as a Roth IRA with
automatic enrollment. OregonSaves’ explicit goal is to boost workers’ personal retirement savings
and thereby decrease dependency on Social Security and means-tested social transfers. 3 In this
paper, we examine who opted out of OregonSaves and why, how the program affected saving
patterns for participating employees, and whether it seems likely to meaningfully increase
retirement savings for participants.
A key rationale offered to justify state-based mandatory automatic enrollment retirement
plans is that the vast majority of workers lacking access to employer-sponsored retirement plans
has no dedicated retirement saving vehicles. 4 According to the 2014 Summary of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP), only 22.1% of employees working at a firm without a pension plan
had opened an IRA, and only 7.6% were actively contributing. In other words, while workers who
lack employer-sponsored retirement plans could respond by opening and funding their own
Traditional or Roth IRAs, the vast majority do not, resulting in few accumulated retirement assets.
Whether we should expect Oregon’s state-sponsored retirement plan to significantly increase

See Miller et al. (2015) and rebuttals by Biggs and Schieber (2015, 2019a, 2019b). Also see Bee and Mitchell (2017).
OregonSaves and Illinois’ Secure Choice began enrolling employees in 2017; California’s CalSavers began enrolling
employees in July 2019. As of December 2020, Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, and New Jersey have also taken
steps to offer a state-sponsored IRA featuring automatic enrollment.
3
The program’s official designation is the Oregon Retirement Savings Plan, referenced in the enabling legislation and
Oregon Revised Statutes 178.200-178.245. See Belbase and Sanzenbacher (2018) and Bradford (2017) for additional
discussion.
4
See, for example, Gale and John (2018). Biggs (2016) notes some of the difficulties in measuring pension coverage
in the U.S. workforce, depending on the dataset used.
1
2
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retirement savings among this population depends crucially on why workers are not already
saving.
In what follows, we examine three non-mutually exclusive explanations for the dearth of
employee-initiated retirement savings, which we refer to as the “search costs,” “can’t afford to
save,” and “don’t need to save” hypotheses. The search costs hypothesis posits that the
introduction of an automatic-enrollment retirement plan will increase the fraction of workers
contributing to a retirement savings account by eliminating the search cost associated with learning
about and enrolling in an IRA. 5 Because prior research has shown that earnings, financial literacy,
and the extent of retirement planning are positively correlated (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell 2007;
Clark et al. 2017), these search costs may be particularly large within the sample of workers
targeted by OregonSaves. 6 Furthermore, studies of participant behavior in employer-provided
401(k) plans find that the younger, lower-paid, and less educated workers are more likely to adopt
default savings rates and invest through default investment options (e.g., Madrian and Shea 2001;
Mitchell and Utkus 2012; Chalmers and Reuter 2020). Therefore, if search costs are a primary
reason that many workers are not already saving for retirement, the introduction of an automaticenrollment retirement savings plan is likely to result in high participation rates at the default saving
rate and significant incremental retirement savings. Evidence in Célerier and Matray (2019) that
increased bank branch supply leads to greater wealth and net-worth accumulation in low-income
households implies that supply-side solutions to low savings rates, such as OregonSaves, may lead
to improved welfare.
A second hypothesis is that workers targeted by OregonSaves cannot afford to save for

Madrian and Shea (2001) were the first to demonstrate that the introduction of automatic enrollment could
significantly increase participation rates within an existing single employer 401(k) plan.
6
Carlin, et. al. (2013) make the theoretical argument that default features, similar to those in OregonSaves, that reduce
search costs are likely to be welfare enhancing if participants are sufficiently homogeneous in their preferences.
5
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retirement. 7 Many households report that they have difficulty meeting even basic expenses. For
example, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2019: page 21) found that “17
percent of adults expected to forgo payment on some of their bills in the month of the survey.”
Such statistics suggest that the marginal utility of consumption is high for many low-income
workers, causing them rationally to prioritize consumption over retirement savings. The larger the
fraction of workers who cannot afford to save, the lower the optimal participation rate, and the
higher the expected opt out rate.
The third hypothesis for low pre-existing savings rates is that workers do not believe that
additional savings will improve their welfare. Because Social Security benefit replacement rates
are relatively high for low-income workers, lower-paid employees at firms lacking employersponsored retirement plans may rationally decide to consume more, rather than increasing their
retirement savings. 8 In addition, low-income workers may not intend ever to retire. Like those that
cannot afford to save, employees who believe there is insufficient value to additional retirement
savings are likely to opt out at high rates (as are the small fraction of employees who already
contribute to an IRA).
The introduction of OregonSaves allows us to determine how workers who previously
lacked access to workplace retirement plans respond when an automatic-enrollment retirement
savings plan is introduced. While there have been numerous studies of automatic enrollment in

For example, Bronchetti, et al. (2011) find that low income taxpayers receiving a tax refund are not substantially
more likely to save their refund when saving is offered as opt out versus opt in. They do find, however, that savings
take-up rates rise when refunds are larger.
8
The CBO (2019: p. 18) finds that “replacement rate based on all earnings from age 22 through age 61 is 80 percent
for workers born in the 1960s whose lifetime earnings fall in the lowest earnings quintile, more than double the 34
percent for workers whose earnings fall in the highest quintile.” At the same time, it is not clear that lower income
households accurately estimate their Social Security benefits. Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) find that knowledge of
social security benefits is negatively correlated with lifetime income and wealth. For example, in the first and second
lifetime income deciles, only 11.2% and 16.3% of respondents provide estimates of their Social Security Benefits that
were between 75 and 125 percent of actual benefits.
7
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large firms offering 401(k) plans, we know little about whether such evidence will generalize to
lower-income workers employed by smaller firms that do not offer their own retirement savings
plans. 9 Our analysis of individual-level administrative data thus sheds light on participation
decisions, contribution rates, and the evolution of account balances, as well as the reasons that
employees give for opting out of OregonSaves.
Importantly, these data allow us to examine the relative importance of our three hypotheses
regarding why some workers do not save. If the low pre-existing levels of retirement saving are
primarily due to high search costs, then we anticipate finding relatively high participation rates
under OregonSaves and persistent contributions. In addition, since the program mandates a 5%
default saving rate, if this is perceived by OregonSaves participations to be a “recommended”
savings rate, we expect little variation in observed savings rates. However, if low pre-existing
levels of retirement saving are primarily due to workers’ inability (or perceived lack of need) to
save for retirement, then we anticipate finding low participation rates and low saving rates,
especially among workers with lower and more volatile earnings profiles. 10
Our analysis of account-level data from August 2018 through April 30, 2020 provides
evidence that all three hypotheses play a role in participants’ behavior. Consistent with the search
cost hypothesis, OregonSaves is generating savings for a substantial number of employees: in fact,
more than 67,700 employees accumulated over $51 million dollars through April 2020 (and $79.1
million through November 2020; CRR 2020). However, consistent with significant liquidity
constraints, even our upper bound participation rate estimate of 62.4% is significantly below the
Madrian and Shea (2001) and Stock and Wise (1990) focused on participant behavior within the retirement plan of
a single large firm. Studies of participant behavior across multiple firms, such as Carroll et al. (2009) and Mitchell
and Utkus (2012), have examined firms offering company-based 401(k) or 403(b) retirement plans.
10
Carroll et al. (2009: 1668) pointed to the benefit of active decision-making with respect to savings rates under the
assumption that desired savings rates likely vary across employees regardless of their financial literacy levels. Yet
given evidence on the depth of financial illiteracy, they concluded that “[w]ell-chosen defaults are likely to be superior
to active decisions in the asset allocation domain.”
9
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levels observed in studies of firm-sponsored 401(k) plans, likely reflecting our finding that
employers targeted by OregonSaves are disproportionately in industries with lower wages, more
volatile wages, and higher levels of job turnover. The lower bound estimated participation rate,
based on those having a positive account balance, is 34.3%. 11 Furthermore, 30.3% of those who
opt out say they do so because they “can’t afford to save,” and the likelihood of stating this is
significantly higher in those industries with lower average wages. The fact that OregonSaves is
targeting a low-income population that has not traditionally been served by workplace retirement
saving accounts in the United States argues against focusing solely on participation rates when
evaluating its success. Indeed, in some cases, the welfare of low-income workers might be
improved by opting out of the plan until their budget constraints relax.
Consistent with the “don’t need to save” hypothesis, 23.9% of those who opt out state that
“I have my own retirement plan,” and this answer is relatively more likely among employees in
higher-wage industries. While this is the second most common reason given for opting out, it
suggests that only 9.7% of the workers targeted by OregonSaves have an existing IRA or 401(k)
plan, versus 22.1% in the SIPP dataset. 12 This difference likely arises from the fact that
OregonSaves serves a lower-income population than is included by SIPP. It also suggests that
there is relatively little scope for OregonSaves to crowd out existing retirement plan contributions.
To shed additional light on who is the most likely to participate in OregonSaves, we focus
on the cross-section of employees three months after their initial eligibility date (which is
determined by the month when their employer first provides their data to OregonSaves). We find

11
Quinby, et al. (2020) use OregonSaves data for September 2018 to September 2019 to calculate participation rates.
Their lower bound estimate (based on positive account balances) is 48 percent and their upper bound estimate (based
on a positive saving rate) is 67 percent. In part, our rates are lower because all of their calculations condition on active
employees at employers that have made at least one contribution into OregonSaves.
12
See Online Appendix Table 1 for a comparison between OregonSaves employees and the SIPP sample.
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that younger employees are less likely to opt out, as are employees who have already been exposed
to OregonSaves through a prior job, who work in larger firms, and who work at firms that have
already made payroll contributions to OregonSaves. 13 Conversely, and consistent with perceived
liquidity constraints, opt out rates are higher when the local unemployment rate is higher, or when
our industry-level measure of income volatility is higher. Employees who are terminated are less
likely to opt out but also less likely to accumulate any assets during this three-month window, a
phenomenon that drives a wedge between formal opt out rates and participation rates inferred from
positive account balances.
While there has been a steady increase in assets under management, there is considerable
dispersion in OregonSaves account balances. When we focus on the set of employees with at least
one contribution into OregonSaves, the average account balance is $754, and the average monthly
account-level inflow is $117. Yet the fraction of accounts with any inflows falls from 65.6% in
August 2018 to 34.4% in April 2020, a pattern which is largely driven by job turnover. Monthly
account-level outflows are far less common (impacting 2-3% of accounts per month), but they are
much larger in magnitude. The average outflow rose from $355 in August 2018 to $590 in April
2020. 14 When we compare employees who are classified by their employers as being active in
month t, to those who are not, we find predictable differences in asset accumulation. Employees
active 18 months after their initial contribution have an average account balance of $1,132
(including $0s), versus $370 for those classified as inactive. The fact that the youngest employees
(age 18-25) are the least likely to remain active explains why they accumulate the least assets
($487 at month 18, versus $980 to $1,186 for those age 36-75). While our ability to measure the

About half of the firms in our sample have not initiated payroll transfers to OregonSaves.
The Roth IRA and modest earnings on the default money market fund for the first $1,000 of investments reduces
tax implications of withdrawals.
13
14
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impact of COVID-19 related economic shocks is limited by the fact that our data end in April
2020, we do find a 13.9% drop in the likelihood of any inflows in April 2020. This drop is
consistent with large job losses that month not yet reflected in the employee job status variable.
More generally, we find that the likelihood of withdrawals spike following job turnover,
suggesting that withdrawals from OregonSaves are used to smooth consumption. 15
Overall, we conclude that OregonSaves has meaningfully increased employee savings by
reducing search costs. The 34.3% of workers with positive account balances in April 2020 is
comparable to the marginal increase in participation of around 30% in the large firm examined by
Madrian and Shea (2001). Nevertheless, there are significant constraints to the savings that autoenrollment savings plans can achieve when provided to workers in industries and firms with low
wages, volatile wages, and high turnover. Our evidence suggests that employees who are opting
out of OregonSaves are often doing so for rational reasons.
II. Institutional Details
OregonSaves is structured as a Roth Individual Retirement Account (IRA) with automatic
enrollment and a default after-tax contribution rate of 5%. Although similar to privately-managed
employer-sponsored 401(k) and 403(b) retirement plans, there are four important differences.
First, all private-sector firms without existing employer-sponsored retirement plans are required
to enroll their employees in the state-sponsored plan. Second, unlike most plans featuring
automatic enrollment, there is no scope for an employer match; contributions are limited to those
made by the employee. Third, when a worker moves from one OregonSaves-participating
employer to another, contributions flow to the same account, reducing the likelihood of multiple

Quinby, et. al. (2020) use data for September 2018 to September 2019 to classify participants into five categories.
They find that the probability of any outflows is highest among the subset of “job changers.”
15
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accounts with small balances. Fourth, by default, the first $1,000 deposited into the OregonSaves
account is invested in a money market fund, with contributions above that threshold automatically
invested in an age-based target date fund (TDF). One appealing feature of this plan design is that
participants can access a substantial portion of their money without risk of tax penalty, allowing
OregonSaves to function as both a liquid savings account and a retirement savings plan. 16
While the default saving rate in OregonSaves is 5% of each paycheck, participants may
select any (integer) contribution rate between 0% and 100%. 17 In addition, OregonSaves features
automatic escalation, with the saving rate increasing by 1 percentage point on January of each
calendar year, up to a maximum of 10 percent. Participants may override the default asset
allocation scheme by selecting any investment(s) from the state-determined menu which includes
a money market fund, a suite of target date funds, and the State Street Equity 500 Index Fund.
The OregonSaves program was rolled out to employers in seven waves. The first wave
consisted of firms volunteering to be in the pilot program, followed by six compulsory waves of
decreasing employer size. The largest firms (100+ employees) began the compulsory registration
period on October 1, 2017. The smallest firms (4 or fewer employees) were scheduled to start
enrolling May 12, 2020, but the deadline was then pushed to January 15, 2021, due to the COVID19 pandemic. Nevertheless, smaller firms were allowed to register employees before their official
wave and, because of the lack penalties for non-participation, some large, reluctant employers may
still have not registered. 18

As with other Roth IRAs, participants can withdraw contributions (but not investment returns) without penalty up
to age 59 ½, or in the event of a qualifying disability or for first-time home buyers.
17
Up to the legal limit for Roth IRA contributions, which in 2019 were $6,000 per year (or $7,000 for those age 50+);
OregonSaves (2019).
18
Firms which offer their own retirement plans are exempted from the mandate to offer the OregonSaves platform.
All other employers are required to register, though penalties for failing to register were to be implemented from
January 2020 (later postponed due to the pandemic). According to Senate Bill 164, “the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Labor and Industries may assess against an employer who has engaged in an unlawful practice under section 2 of
this 2019 Act a civil penalty in an amount up to $100 for each employee who is eligible to participate in the plan
16
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OregonSaves provides employers with a pre-designed plan and safe harbor from fiduciary
responsibility, thereby reducing set-up and monitoring costs. 19 Once an employer is registered, it
submits employee names, social security numbers, and dates of birth to OregonSaves, which
commences a 30-day enrollment period. If an employee does not opt out during the first 15 days,
OregonSaves attempts to verify her tax identification number and, if successful, opens an
individual Roth IRA for her at the end of the 30-day window. At that point, employers can direct
contributions to OregonSaves. After registering, employers are also able to provide updates to
participants’ employment status to the OregonSaves administrator.
III. OregonSaves Participant and Plan Statistics
In this section, we present summary statistics for OregonSaves-covered employers and
employees. We have obtained anonymized individual-level monthly administrative data for all
workers who had access to the program through April 2020, including workers who opted out of
OregonSaves during the enrollment window, those who stopped contributing before the end of our
sample period, and those who have yet to contribute. The dataset includes employee-level
information on age, saving rates, and employer, as well as account-level information on monthly
contributions and withdrawals and asset allocation. 20 We also possess employer-level information
on industry and firm size, and the date on which each employer first directs employee contributions
to OregonSaves. 21

developed under ORS 178.205, not to exceed an aggregate amount of $5,000 in a calendar year.” Senate Bill 164 was
signed into law by Governor Kate Brown on May 22, 2019.
See https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2019R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/SB164/Enrolled.
19
Scott and Hines (2020) survey OregonSaves’ participating employers and find that approximately 80% of
participating employers report no out of pocket costs associated with the program.
20
In this section, our unit of observation is the employer-employee pair. Because individual employees can be enrolled
into OregonSaves by multiple employers, they can be assigned multiple employee identification codes; however, they
can only have one OregonSaves account.
21
Because our data are derived from a number of sources including information entered by employers, employees,
and the record keeper, there are inevitably data entry errors. Our analysis filters out approximately 800 individual

10
Table 1 shows the total number of employers and employer-employee pairs covered by the
OregonSaves program. Column (1) presents the cumulative number of employers that uploaded
employee information to the OregonSaves administrator by the end of each month between August
2018 and April 2020. Column (2) presents the subset of employers that processed payroll for at
least one employee by the end of each month. By the end of April 2020, 11,088 employers had
registered their employees with OregonSaves, but only 5,537 had directed any contributions to
OregonSaves. Some portion of this gap can be explained by the fact that processing payroll takes
time and many employers registered at the end of 2019.
Table 1 here
Column (3) reports the cumulative number of employees whose names had been provided
by their employers to the OregonSaves administrators. Approximately 289,657 employees have
engaged at some level with OregonSaves by the end of our sample period, including employees
who opted out of the program. Column (4) reports the subset of employees whose employers have
directed a contribution to OregonSaves, showing that by April 2020, 226,178 employees are
working (or were previously working) at employers that processed OregonSaves contributions for
at least one employee. By comparing columns (1) and (2) in April 2020, we observe that
approximately half of all employers have not processed payroll. However, by comparing columns
(3) and (4) in April 2020, we see that nearly 80% of all registered employees work at employers
that have begun directing employee contributions to OregonSaves, thus making positive account
balances possible.
Column (5) reports the cumulative number of employees classified by the administrator as
both eligible to participate and actively working. Employees are eligible to participate if the initial
accounts due to errors such as age being outside the range of 18 to 100, or contributions being negative. All of the
statistics that we report reflect these initial filters.
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30-day enrollment window closes and their identities are verified. The administrator includes a
flag indicating whether an employee is active or inactive in month t. For over 93% of the employeemonths classified as inactive, we observe a reason that the employee is inactive (e.g., terminated,
seasonal layoff, or deceased). Because the administrator only updates an employee’s status when
an employer updates it with OregonSaves, the sample of eligible and active employees almost
certainly overstates the number of employees still employed in month t. Column (6) reports the
cumulative number of eligible and active employees whose employers have processed
contributions, which is the maximum number of employees who could feasibly contribute to
OregonSaves each month.
Column (7) reports the cumulative number of employees with a positive account balance
at the end of each month, while column (8) reports the cumulative number of employees with an
open account in month t with a positive account balance during any portion of our sample period
(even if the positive balance occurs after month t). The difference of 8,728 between columns (7)
and (8) in April 2020 represents the number of employee-employer pairs that made contributions
into OregonSaves but subsequently withdrew their entire balances. 22
A common measure of retirement plan efficacy is the participation rate. Madrian and Shea
(2001) reported that automatic enrollment in one large 401(k) plan of a large relatively high-wage
firm resulted in a participation rate of 85.9%, with the largest increases being for younger, lowerincome workers. Mindful of the fact that we are measuring participation rates in a set of firms
having lower pay and higher turnover, we offer two different measures of participation in Table 1.
The Global Participation Rate is the number of employees with current positive account balances

Note that the totals in columns (7) and (8) slightly overstate the total number of unique accounts. This is because a
participant who works for two different employers during our sample period will appear as two employee-employer
pairs, but the participant makes all contributions into a single OregonSaves account.
22
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(column (7)) divided by the total number of employees ever entered into the OregonSaves system
by employers who processed payroll (column (4)). The Global Participation Rate is 34.3% at the
end of our sample period. The Global Participation Rate decreases as more employees formally
opt out, as more employees set their savings rate to zero, as more employees become inactive due
to job turnover, and as more employees who previously contributed into OregonSaves withdraw
their account balances.
Our second measure is the Feasible Participation Rate, defined as the number of
employees who have a positive account balance at some point during our sample period (column
(8)) divided by the number of number of active, eligible employees working at employers who
already processed contributions (column (6)). Thus, the Feasible Participation Rate measures the
proportion of employees that could, with near certainty, show up as participants in OregonSaves
since they are active, eligible, and are with an employer directing contributions to OregonSaves.
The Feasible Participation Rate is 62.4% at the end of our sample period. While both participation
rates are considerably lower than the 85.9% estimated by Madrian and Shea (2001), they represent
significant increases relative to the counterfactual participation rates within the population of lowincome workers targeted by OregonSaves, which are arguably close to zero. If we assume that the
marginal impact of OregonSaves on retirement participation is on the order of 30%, this is similar
in magnitude to the average causal estimate of the impact of automatic enrollment in Madrian and
Shea, despite the absence of any employer match.
Table 2 presents employee-level summary statistics by industry, using panel data through
April 2020. Columns (1) and (2) show the number of employees by industry and the number of
eligible and active employees working at firms that have processed payroll. The largest industries
represented in OregonSaves are food services, business support, health care, and retail trade. It is

13
our understanding that a large number of the health care workers can best be described as homehealth care workers.
Table 2 here
We report summary statistics in columns (3) through (11) for the entire sample of 289,657
employee-employer pairs. Age is defined as the calendar year in which the employee first appears
in the administrative data minus the stated year of birth. We report the mean, median, and
interquartile (25th to 75th) range. The average age for employees who had access to OregonSaves
(including participants and those who opted out) is 36 (median is 33).
Two measures of job turnover rates are provided. Annual turnover equals one if the
employee was classified as “terminated,” on “seasonal layoff,” or “out of business,” 12 months
after becoming eligible to contribute (based on one observation per employee with at least 12
months of OregonSaves administrative data). Similarly, monthly turnover equals one if the
employee was “active” in month t-1 but classified as “terminated,” on “seasonal layoff,” or “out
of business” in month t (where the unit of observations is now employee-employer-month). The
classification of employees’ job status is provided to the administrator by employers. To the extent
that employers fail to update job status in a timely manner, our estimated turnover rates will
understate actual turnover rates. 23 Despite this caveat, there is a positive correlation between the
number of employees within each industry and the turnover rate, which suggests OregonSaves
covers many contingent and temporary workers who usually lack access to employment-based
defined contribution plans.
We estimate monthly after-tax earnings at the employee-month level as the total monthly
contributions divided by the current savings rate (e.g., $100 after-tax contribution divided by 5%
In unreported results, we find employers that have not yet processed payroll are significantly less likely to report
any changes in employee status.
23
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implies $2,000 in after-tax income). Monthly earnings can be estimated only for the subset of
employees who made positive contributions to their accounts. The mean, median, and interquartile
range within the full sample are $2,365, $1,883, and $1,960, respectively. Employees in the largest
industries represented in OregonSaves, such as business support, food services, and health care,
have monthly earnings lower than the average of the entire OregonSaves workforce. The
correlation between industry-level monthly turnover rates and industry-level mean monthly
earnings is -0.52, implying that lower-income jobs have higher turnover rates. Finally, we report
the within-employee standard deviation of monthly earnings, calculated at the employee level
using all months with positive contributions within each employee-employer pair (i.e., we exclude
any months without contributions). The average per person monthly volatility of earnings is $945,
or nearly half the mean after-tax earnings of $2,365. This high level of volatility illustrates that the
average participant in OregonSaves faces substantial monthly income uncertainty.
IV. Cross-sectional Evidence on OregonSaves Opt Out Rates and Account Balances
Having shown that OregonSaves is extending access to the new savings plan to workers in
low-income, high-turnover industries, we next analyze opt out decisions. If the “search cost”
hypothesis dominates, we expect to find low opt out rates, aside from those who already have a
retirement savings plan. Under the “can’t afford to save” and “don’t need to save” hypotheses, we
expect to observe higher opt out rates among employees in industries with lower wages and higher
turnover. 24
In Table 3, we focus on each employee three months after her initial month of eligibility,
which is defined as the first month in which she would become eligible to contribute into

The fact that we cannot measure income unless an employee contributes to OregonSaves prompts us to focus on
industry-level income measures.
24
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OregonSaves if she has not formally opted out, is still employed, and has had her identity
successfully verified. 25 The total number of employees reported in column (1) is lower than Tables
1 and 2 because the relevant month for some employees is before August 2018 or after April 2020.
Table 3 here
Column (2) reports that, on average, 40.9% of employees formally opt out of OregonSaves
within three months of their initial eligibility dates. The correlation between the industry-level opt
out rate and the mean industry-level earnings in Table 2 is 0.73, suggesting that industries with
higher earnings levels are more likely to opt out of OregonSaves. While this correlation is broadly
consistent with evidence that lower-paid employees are more likely to accept default options (as
in Chalmers and Reuter, 2020, and Mitchell and Utkus, 2012), it runs counter to the “can’t afford
to save” hypothesis.
At our request, the administrator asked employees who formally opted out to provide a
reason for doing so. Conditional on opting out, 30.3% of employees respond that they cannot afford
to save, while 25.9% say that they already have a retirement plan. The across-industry correlation
between “can’t afford to save” and mean earnings is -0.52, while the across-industry correlation
between “already have a plan” and mean earnings is 0.24. In other words, conditional on opting
out, employees in lower-paying industries are more likely to cite lack of income and less likely to
cite having an existing retirement account.
In addition to summarizing the fraction of employees who formally opt out, we also use
account balances at the same point in time to shed light on participation rates. Columns (5) through
(7) report the fractions of all employees lacking an account, having an open account with a balance

In Online Appendix Table 2, we document that the formal opt out rate does not change significantly after month
three. In Online Appendix Table 3, we report the month three opt out rate separately for each month. It is slightly
higher at the end of our sample period than at the beginning.
25
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of $0, and having an open account with a positive balance, respectively. Overall, the fraction of
employees with no account three months after their initial eligibility date is 71.9%. This includes
people who opt out, cannot have their identities verified, are no longer employed when the
employer begins directing contributions to OregonSaves, or are employed by a firm that has not
begun directing contributions to OregonSaves. Of the remaining employees, 26.7% have a positive
balance and 1.4% have a $0 balance.
The remaining columns report the mean, median, and interquartile range of the account
balance for the subset of employees with positive account balances three months after becoming
eligible to contribute. Average balances after three months of eligibility range from a low of $192
for workers in the Arts/Entertainment sector, to a high of $462 for Professional/Scientific
employees. Unsurprisingly, the across-industry correlation between average account balances and
mean industry earnings from Table 2 is 0.92, which is consistent with employees in higher-paying
industries making larger monthly contributions.
Table 4 summarizes the reasons that employees give for opting out from OregonSaves
using the full sample rather than conditioning on the third month after registration. The top panel
focuses on the options that employees were offered in our survey. Again, the most common reason
cited for opting out is “I can’t afford to save at this time” (28.6% of all employees) and the second
most common reason is “I have my own retirement plan” (23.9%). The third most common is
“Other,” but with no additional details. The fourth most common is “I’m not interested in
contributing through this employer.” which may indicate that the employee is working a part time
or second job, or that the employee is not currently interested in saving for retirement. The bottom
panel summarizes the open responses, which we manually assigned to a handful of categories.
Here, the most popular responses could be summarized as “Not interested.” There were a number
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of responses related to eligibility (e.g., “I am no longer employed there” or “I will be leaving
Oregon soon” or “I am too young to participate”) or the need for the program (“I am already
retired” or “This is temporary work”). Slightly less than 1 percent objected to being automatically
enrolled in the plan, and slightly less than 0.1 percent objected to the level of fees.
Table 4 here
If we assume that all OregonSaves-eligible workers with an existing retirement plan opt
out of OregonSaves, then the 23.9% of respondents saying they have their own retirement plan
implies that 9.7% (equals 23.9% times 117,345 divided by 289,657) of OregonSaves’ population
already have an IRA or employer-sponsored retirement account. If we assume that only half of the
workers with an existing retirement plan opt out, the fraction doubles to 19.4%, and it is still below
the 22.1% implied by the 2014 SIPP. In either case, it is clear that a large majority of potential
participants is unlikely to be saving for retirement outside of OregonSaves.
To explore heterogeneity in employee behavior regarding participation and account
balances, we estimate a series of linear probability models. In Table 5, the dependent variable
equals 100 if employee i formally opted out of OregonSaves within three months of the initial
eligibility date, and zero otherwise, allowing us to interpret coefficients as increases in percentage
points. Employee-level controls include age dummies (the reference group is age 18-25); account
holder location indicators (the reference group is living in an urban Oregon zip code); dummy
variables indicating whether this is the second or third (or more) time that the individual worked
at an OregonSaves-covered employer; and an indicator of whether the employee terminated in or
before month t. In all but one specification, we also control for the average unemployment rate
over the prior three months in the Oregon (or Washington) county corresponding to the accountlevel mailing address. Employer-level independent variables include firm size (measured as the
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natural logarithm of the number of employees in the month that the firm joins OregonSaves) and
variables indicating whether the employer joined OregonSaves during the pilot phase; whether the
employer registered after the OregonSaves deadline based on its firm size; and whether the
employer had processed contributions for at least one employee through month t. Industry-level
controls include median employee earnings within the industry in month t (as inferred by us) and
the standard deviation of employee earnings within the industry in month t. Standard errors are
clustered by employer.
Table 5 here
The first column is restricted to employees who live in Oregon or Washington, allowing
us to control for the average unemployment rate in the employee’s county over the prior three
months. Column (2) includes an additional 4,520 employees who live outside of Oregon and
Washington but are covered by OregonSaves, likely because their employers are based in Oregon.
Columns (3) and (4) include industry fixed effects. Column (4) also includes the fraction of
employee i's coworkers that had formally opted out as of month t-1. Column (5) replaces the
industry fixed effects with firm fixed effects and drops any employer characteristics that are timeinvariant, as well as the industry income measures. All columns include year-month fixed effects.
Across all specifications, we find that older workers are significantly more likely to opt out
than their younger counterparts. One interpretation is that older workers are more likely than
younger workers to have their own retirement plans, reducing the need for additional savings.
Another interpretation is that, because they are closer to retirement, they perceive less benefit from
beginning to save. We also find that employees with prior exposure to OregonSaves are less likely
to opt out, perhaps because they come to recognize the value of a portable retirement plan.
Additionally, employees who terminate during the three months after the initial eligibility date are
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much less likely to opt out, presumably because they see no need to opt out of a plan affiliated
with an employer from whom they are no longer earning an income. The implication is that
terminated workers will neither opt out from OregonSaves nor accumulate any savings.
With respect to employer characteristics, we find that employees in larger businesses are
less likely to opt out. Employees working at employers that participated in the pilot program are
also less likely to opt out, presumably because these employers were the most enthusiastic about
introducing their employees to the OregonSaves program. Finally, employees whose employers
demonstrate a level of cooperation with OregonSaves by processing contributions are generally
less likely to opt out. The exception is that the coefficient becomes positive and marginally
significant (at the 10-percent level) when we include employer fixed effects, suggesting that
workers hired after the pilot-program employer begins processing payroll are more likely to opt
out than the initial set of workers enrolled in OregonSaves.
As we found above, employees in industries with higher earnings (e.g., “Finance and
Insurance” and “Information”) are also more likely to opt out. To the extent that they are already
saving for retirement or have a concrete plan for doing so in the future, they have less need for a
program like OregonSaves. At the same time, consistent with financial constraints, employees in
industries with more volatile income (e.g., “Agriculture,” “Construction,” and “Real Estate”), and
who live in counties with higher unemployment rates, are more likely to opt out. Neither income
nor its volatility has explanatory power when we include industry fixed effects, suggesting that the
relevant variation is across industry rather than within industry.
When we include the fraction of employees opting out at an employer in the prior month,
we find a large significantly positive coefficient, and the R2 jumps from 0.104 to 0.275. One
interpretation is that employees are influenced by their peers’ opt out decisions. A non-mutually
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exclusive interpretation is that employers are influencing the opt out rate directly, perhaps by
highlighting what they perceive to be problems with the program.
While Table 5 sheds light on the formal participation decision, it does not shed direct light
on the accumulation of retirement assets, which is the ultimate goal of OregonSaves. Therefore, in
Table 6, we use a similar set of linear probability models to predict positive account balances. The
dependent variable equals 100 if an employee has a positive account balance three months after
his initial eligibility date, and zero otherwise. Column (1) focuses on the 126,778 employees who
live in Oregon or Washington and have not formally opted out through month three. 26 The
remaining columns are limited to employees whose employers have processed contributions. The
independent variables and fixed effects mirror Table 5. Column (4) includes the fraction of
employee’s coworkers with a positive account balance in the previous month.
Table 6 here
Several of the findings here are consistent with those in Table 5. Older workers and workers
in industries with higher median incomes are more likely to opt out, and less likely to have a
positive balance. Similarly, workers being exposed to OregonSaves through a second job are less
likely to opt out and more likely to have a positive balance. Nevertheless, many of the other
findings are at odds. Employees at larger firms, employees living outside of Oregon, and
employees at firms that participated in the pilot program are all less likely to opt out, but
conditional on not opting out, are also less likely to hold a positive account balance. The same is
true for employees that terminate before the end of the three-month window. In fact, the majority
of employees neither opts out nor has a positive account balance within three months of eligibility.

By conditioning on not having formally opted out by month three, we are excluding some employees with positive
account balances. However, the fraction of employees who do not opt out and have positive account balance is 42.5%,
while the fraction who do opt out and have a positive account balance is only 5.3%.

26
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In part, this reflects the large number of employers that has not processed payroll for any of their
employees, and, in part, it reflects employee turnover and withdrawals. However, the fact that pilot
employers sought to participate in OregonSaves before they were required to do so makes the lack
of positive account balances among employees hired after the pilot program all the more puzzling.
At firms that processed payroll for employees, the employees are significantly more likely
to have a positive account balance, a result that is largely mechanical. In column (4), we observe
that positive account balances are strongly predicted by the proportion of positive balance accounts
at the participant’s employer in the prior month. As in Table 5, this estimate could be driven by
peer effects, in concert with transparent or opaque employer influences on employees’
participation.
Overall, the findings in this section provide support for all three of the hypotheses that we
offered at the outset to explain low retirement savings rates. Consistent with search costs, we find
much higher participant rates among younger workers (who are likely less financially literate) and
those being exposed to the OregonSaves program for the second or third time. Moreover, while
our estimated participation rate ranges from 34.3% to 62.4%, it is important to remember that
OregonSaves is targeting workers without access to a traditional employer-sponsored retirement
plan, for whom the baseline retirement saving rate is near 0%. The hypothesis that low savings
rates occur because people can’t afford to save also finds support. Opt out rates are increasing in
the local unemployment rate and the volatility of industry income, and employees in industries
with lower earnings are more likely to state that they cannot afford to save when opting out. In
some sense, these opt out choices are reassuring, because they likely reflect an optimal decision to
prioritize current consumption (for which the marginal utility is high) over savings. Finally, the
behavior of older workers and workers in industries with higher income levels are both potentially
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consistent with the “don’t need to save” hypothesis. Older participants may have a more precise
estimate of the social security replacement rate they will face at retirement, reducing the perceived
value of participating in OregonSaves, and workers in higher income industries are the most likely
to have a preexisting retirement savings plan.
V. Evolution of Saving Rates
Turning to the distribution of saving rates, columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 again focus on
employees three months after their initial eligibility month. Column (1) presents the distribution
of contribution rates for all employees, including those who opted out of the program (for whom
the saving rate is coded as 0%). We see that over 98% of employees have a saving rate of either
0% or 5%. Column (2) excludes employees who have formally opted out. The fact that 3.9% of
employees still have a saving rate of 0% implies that some employees informally opt out by setting
their saving rate to 0% without ever formally notifying their employers that they are opting out. In
columns (3) and (4), we examine the contribution rate for each employee-employer pair in each
month, allowing us to incorporate information on saving rates in sample months after month three.
Column (3) focuses on all employees, while column (4) focuses on employees who are active,
eligible, have an open account, and have not formally opted out in month t. Comparing columns
(2) and (4), we observe a decrease in the fraction of employees with a saving rate of 5% and an
increase in the fractions with saving rates of 0%, 6%, and 7%. The increased use of 6% and 7%
saving rates is particularly noticeable in column (4), reflecting the impact of automatic escalation
of 1% additional saving, implemented every January.
Table 7 here
Table 8 illustrates how contribution rates change from month to month. We focus on
employees who are active, eligible, have an open account, and have not formally opted out in that
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month (the sample in column (4) of Table 7). For each employee-employer-month, we create the
pair (contribution rates at month t-1, contribution rate at month t). 27 We then tabulate the number
of pairs in each bin of the matrix with the current rate on the horizontal axis and the lagged
contribution rate on the vertical axis. As expected, the diagonal of this matrix contains the largest
number of participant month observations, implying that saving rate decisions are extremely
sticky. Overall, the last two columns of Table 7 show that 2.8% of participant-months involve a
contribution rate increase versus 2.0% that involve a decrease; much of this difference can be
attributed to the automatic escalation feature of OregonSaves. Specifically, there are 23,394 cases
where the saving rate rises from 5% to 6%, and another 5,204 cases where it increases from 6% to
7%. 28 In other words, while opt out rates are significantly higher in our sample than for higherpaid employees of larger firms, the vast majority of those who do not opt out accept both the
default saving rate and automatic escalation. Tables 7 and 8 are largely consistent with the search
costs hypothesis, in that participants are willing to accept the default saving rate, conditional on
participation. For those participants who do not wish to participate, there is clear evidence that
they are capable of reducing their saving rates to zero.
In sum, then, and consistent with prior research on the stickiness of default saving rates
(e.g., Madrian and Shea 2001), we find that the vast majority of participating employees saves at
the 5% default rate. Savings rates of 6% and 7% appear to be driven almost entirely driven by
automatic escalation. In other words, we observe far more variation along the extensive margin
(opting out) than along the intensive margin (saving rate).

We combine all contribution rates greater than 7% into a single category, as only a small fraction of people elect a
rate higher than 7% over the period we examine.
28
In Online Appendix Table 4, we show that rate increases are clustered on January 2019 and January 2020, the
months in which automatic escalation applies.
27
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VI. Evolution of Account Balances
We conclude by exploring the dynamics of flows into and out of OregonSaves accounts.
Table 9 and Figure 1 summarize the substantial growth of OregonSaves over our sample period.
In August 2018, there were $6.7 million in assets and 86.4% of all dollars were invested in the
default money market fund. While there have been steady outflows, they remain small relative to
inflows, resulting in positive net inflows throughout the sample period. By April 2020, assets under
management had grown to $51.0 million, and 58.1% of assets were invested in the money market
fund. In November 2020 (outside of our sample period), total assets exceeded $79.1 million. The
relatively high dollar outflows in the first quarter of 2020 may reflect concerns about COVID-19,
but measured as a percent of assets, they are only slightly above average. The most striking change
is the drop in total inflows in April 2020, which may reflect a sudden decline in earnings due to
job loss.
Table 9 and Figure 1 here
Table 10 focuses on account-level balances, inflows, and outflows. The number of open
accounts increases more than 300% (from 19,078 to 77,007), while the number of open accounts
with positive balances increases 280% (from 17,830 to 67,731). At the end of our study period,
the average (positive) account balance is $754. The average net (non-zero) flow each month is
$90, and the average inflow is $117. Outflows are far less common, but they are much larger in
magnitude. The average outflow is $517. We plot monthly net flows, inflows, and outflows in
Figure 1B. The rightmost column of Table 10 calculates the equal-weighted average asset
allocation to the money market fund. Although 58.1% of OregonSaves’ plan dollars are invested
in the money market fund, when we place equal weight on each account, the fraction rises to
86.2%, because relatively few accounts have balances over $1,000. This finding begs the question
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of whether it is desirable to default the first $1,000 into the money market fund. If the long-term
goal is to allow participants to benefit from the market risk premium, an alternative design might
transfer assets from the money market fund to an age-appropriate TDF after a prescribed period of
time (e.g., three months). 29 By contrast, if the goal were simply to provide an emergency savings
account that participants could use to smooth consumption, retaining the account in safe
investments would be a reasonable default.
Table 10 here
Table 10 also illustrates the contrast between relatively stable outflows and the declining
percentage of accounts with inflows over the sample period. Not surprisingly, the biggest drop in
inflows occurs between March and April of 2020, when the economic effects of COVID closures
were first enacted in Oregon. The general decline in the fraction of accounts with inflows is to be
expected, since accounts enter our sample when an employment relationship begins and remain
open without additional inflows when an employee is terminated or quits. However, to the extent
that the portability features of OregonSaves are effective, the decline in inflows to accounts over
time may be attenuated if employees move from one OregonSaves-participating employer to
another.
In Figure 2A, we focus on employees who made at least one contribution into OregonSaves
and who remain in our dataset for at least 3, 6, 12, or 18 months. We then plot the fraction of these
participants making at least one contribution, contributions in two or more months, contributions
in three or more months, etc. By construction, 100% of the participants make at least one
contribution. Over a three-month horizon, the probability of three consecutive contributions is
70%. When the horizon increases to six months, the probability of at least three contributions
Online Appendix Table 5 reports the fraction of plan assets invested in each fund and Online Appendix Table 6
summarizes monthly returns and flows.
29
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increases to 77%, but the probability of six consecutive contributions drops to 49%. Similarly, the
probability of at least six contributions increases to 61% when the horizon rises to 12 months, but
the probability of 12 consecutive contributions is only 30%. These patterns suggest either that a
significant fraction of employees is opting out during the first 12 months in the program, or that
their employment status is fluid.
Figure 2 here
In Figure 2B, we focus on 6,053 employees who made at least one OregonSaves
contribution and who remain in our sample for at least 18 months. We plot the fraction of
participants classified as inactive in month t, the fraction with a saving rate of 0%, and the fraction
classified as inactive or with a saving rate of 0%. The fraction classified as inactive rises from 4%
(in the month of the initial contribution) to 38% in month 18, while the fraction with a saving rate
of 0% rises from 6% to 21%. In other words, the fraction of employees able to contribute to
OregonSaves through their employers is declining monotonically. The fact that 4% of the
employees are classified as inactive in the same month that they make their first contribution into
OregonSaves speaks to the high turnover rates. The fact that 6% of the employees have a saving
rate of 0% at the end of the month may reflect a decision to opt out in response to a reduced
paycheck.
In Tables 11 and 12, we document the significant impact of employee turnover rates on
OregonSaves account balances. The unit of observation is account i in month t, and the sample is
limited to the 59,043 participants who make at least one contribution into OregonSaves during our
sample period. (We exclude anyone with a positive account balance in July 2018.) Table 11 reports
the number of open accounts, fraction with a positive balance, fraction with any inflow or outflow,
and average account balance (including zeroes), separately for employees classified as active
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versus inactive. The fraction of accounts in which the employee is classified as active by at least
one OregonSaves-covered employer falls from 96.8% in month one, to 61.5% in month 18. Among
those classified as active, the average balance increases from $89 to $1,132, while the fraction of
accounts with positive inflows decreases from 99.9% to 48.1%. The likelihood of any outflow
averages around 2.9%. The fact that the likelihood of inflows falls below 50% within a sample of
employees classified as active strongly suggests that the employee status flag is either not being
updated by all employers, not being updated in a timely fashion, or both.
Tables 11 and 12 here
Among those classified as inactive, the average balance increases from $203 to $370, while
the fraction of accounts with positive inflows decreases from 99.8% to 4.4%. The likelihood of
any outflow averages around 1.7%. The fact that the likelihood of inflows does not fall to zero
suggests either that some employees return to work before their employee status is updated by
their employer, or that some individuals contribute directly to their OregonSaves IRA despite not
being currently employed by an OregonSaves-participating firm. To the extent that employees
accumulate $370 in an OregonSaves Roth IRA and make no subsequent contributions or
withdrawals, they may be unaware that they are participating in the program. 30
While we find that younger employees are less likely to opt out and more likely to have a
positive balance within three months of their initial eligibility date, our earlier analysis does not
shed light on the rate at which assets are accumulated. In Table 12, we track employees in different
age groups over time, from month 1 (when they make their first contribution into OregonSaves),
to month 18. The left panel reports the fraction of participants within each age range classified as
active in month t. The right panel reports the corresponding average account balances (including
In Table Online Appendix 7, we report the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of account balances for active
and inactive employees, for months 1 through 18.
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zeroes), and we see that the likelihood of job turnover is decreasing with age. Only 50.7% of
employees under the age of 26 are still active in month 18, versus 85.7% of those over the age of
75. As a result, at the end of 18 months, the youngest employees have accumulated an average of
$487, while the oldest employees have accumulated an average of $887. The highest average
account balance is $1,186 for those between the ages of 56 and 65. In other words, while younger
employees are more likely to participate, their ability to accumulate assets is hampered by high
levels of job turnover. It is also apparent in Table 12 that, while older participants may be less
likely to participate, those who do participate accumulate assets at a higher rate than younger
participants.
We conclude this section by predicting individual-level monthly inflows and outflows. The
dependent variable in column (1) of Table 13 equals 100 if there is an inflow into the account in
month t, and zero otherwise. Similarly, the dependent variable in column (2) equals 100 if there is
any outflow from the account in month t, and zero otherwise. Since outflows are much lumpier
than inflows, the likelihood of any inflow is 55.5%, while the likelihood of any outflow is only
2.6%. To help quantify the impact of turnover and opt out on inflows and outflows, we include
dummy variables to capture whether employees are listed as being actively employed in month t,
whether they terminate during month t, whether they terminate during month t-1, and whether the
saving rate equals 0% in month t (which reflect either a formal opt out or a direct change to the
saving rate). We include age category fixed effects (reference category is age 18-25); the number
of months since the initial contribution fixed effects; calendar year-month fixed effects; and
industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by employer.
Table 13 here
As expected, employment status is a significant predictor of inflows. Being classified as
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active increases the likelihood of any inflow by 52.1% (which is close to the unconditional average
of 55.5%). For those who terminate during month t, the coefficient is 24.3%, likely reflecting
inflows during the month prior to the job turnover. Predictably, setting the saving rate to 0% is
also associated with a reduced probability of any inflows. Controlling for employment status, we
find that the likelihood of any inflow is decreasing in months since the initial contribution, falling
by 25.9% in month 18. The most striking pattern with respect to the calendar year-month fixed
effects is the decline of 13.9% in April 2020. It is conceivable that this reflects a significant loss
of earnings due to COVID-19, one not yet captured by the employment status variable. Finally,
while many of the coefficients on the industry fixed effects are large and negative (relative to the
reference category of a missing industry code), only those for Arts/Entertainment and Business
Support are statistically significant at the 10-percent level or below.
The linear probability model does a much poorer job predicting outflows. While the Rsquared in column (1) is 0.372, it is only 0.016 in column (2). The main predictors of outflows are
recent job turnover, which may reflect the use of outflows to smooth consumption, and decision
to set the saving rate to 0%. Younger participants are also slightly more likely to withdraw
contributions than older participants.
VII. Conclusion
We analyze participation decisions and the evolution of account balances in OregonSaves,
the first state-sponsored auto IRA in the United States. We find that the program is serving
employees across a range of industries, but primarily those with low wages and high turnover. The
average participating employee in our sample earns $2,365 per month, has a within-person
standard deviation of monthly earnings of $945, and an annual job turnover rate of 38.2%.
Consistent with these job traits, OregonSaves participation rates under automatic enrollment are
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significantly lower than in other settings. However, when assessing participation rates between
34.3% and 62.4%, it is important to recall that OregonSaves targets workers lacking access to a
traditional employer-sponsored retirement plan. Only 11% of the employees targeted by
OregonSaves claim to already have retirement savings (half the 22% level in the nationallyrepresentative SIPP). For everyone else, the counterfactual retirement saving rate is near 0%.
In part, the lower participant rates are consistent with the “can’t afford to save” hypothesis.
Opt out rates rise with the local unemployment rate and the volatility of industry income, and
employees in industries with lower earnings are more likely to cite that they cannot afford to save
when opting out. In a sense, these opt out choices are reassuring because they are likely to reflect
an optimal decision to prioritize current consumption (for which the marginal utility is high) over
savings. Relatedly, we observe withdrawals following job turnover, which is more common among
younger workers, and, during April 2020, we observe a large drop in contributions that we attribute
to COVID-19 related job losses and economic uncertainty.
Nonetheless, OregonSaves is generating savings for a substantial number of participants.
Over 67,700 participants accumulated more than $51 million dollars through April 2020, resulting
in an average account balance of $754. Consistent with a search costs rationale for the program,
we see much higher participation rates among younger workers (who are likely less financially
literate) and those being exposed to the OregonSaves program for the second or third time. Because
we find very little variation in saving rates, dispersion in account balances is driven by variation
in salaries and job tenure. Finally, we also find evidence of the “don’t need to save” hypothesis, in
that older workers and workers in industries with higher income levels perceive less benefit to
participating in OregonSaves.
Overall, we conclude that OregonSaves has meaningfully increased employee savings by
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eliminating search costs. Nevertheless, we have also identified limits to what automatic-enrollment
savings plans can achieve when expanded to workers in industries and firms with low wages,
volatile wages, and high turnover rates. Specifically, there is reason to believe that at least part of
the liquid savings generated by employee contributions were drawn down to smooth consumption
during the pandemic. This is not to undermine the value of the saving program; rather it highlights
the key role that OregonSaves accounts are playing for lower-paid workers in times of earnings
and employment volatility. Less clear is whether these accounts will eventually grow into
important vehicles for retirement saving.
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Figure 1. Growth in OregonSaves, August 2018 through April 2020

Panel A reports total assets under management in OregonSaves at the end of each month, in millions of
dollars. Panel B reports equal-weighted average (non-zero) account balances, inflows, and outflows.
Source: Authors calculations; see text.
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Figure 2. Reductions in the Likelihood of Contributions over Time

Panel A focuses on workers who have made at least one contribution into OregonSaves during our sample
period and reports the fraction making at least X contributions over 3, 6, 12, and 18 month periods. Panel
B focuses on the 18-month sample and reports the fraction of workers who are classified as inactive in the
months following the initial contribution, set their saving rate to 0%, or both. Source: Authors calculations;
see text.
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Table 1: Growth of OregonSaves, August 2018 – April 2020

In this table, we summarize the growth of OregonSaves. The unit of observation in columns (1) and (2) is the employer. We report the total number of employers
that have uploaded employees’ information to the OregonSaves administrator during or before month t, and the subset of employers that have processed
contributions for at least one employee. The unit of observation in the remaining columns is the employer-employee pair. Column (3) reports the total number of
employees uploaded to the administrator and column (4) reports the subset working at employers that have processed contributions. Column (5) reports the number
of employees who are classified by the administrator as both eligible to participate and actively working, and column (6) reports the subset working at employers
that have processed contributions. Column (7) reports the number of employees in column (3) with positive account balances in month t and column (8) reports
the number that ever have a positive account balance. Because employee identifiers are unique to employee-employer pairs, and because some individual work for
multiple employers over our sample period, the number of employees with accounts overstates the number of accounts. Finally, we report two participation rates.
The global participation rate is defined as the number of employees with current positive account balances (column (7)) divided by the total number of employees
(column (4)). The feasible participation rate is defined as the number of employees who ever have a positive account balance (column (8)) divided by the number
of number of active, eligible employees working at employers that have already processed payroll (column (6)). Source: Authors calculations.
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Table 2: OregonSaves Employees by Industry

In this table, we provide employee-level summary statistics by industry and within the full sample of employees. “All” corresponds to column (6) of Table 1;
“Eligible & Active & Contributions” corresponds to column (6). Statistics are reported for the “All” sample. Age is defined as the calendar year in which the
employee first appears in the administrative data minus the stated year of birth. We report the mean, median, and interquartile range. We report two measures of
turnover. Annual turnover equals one if the employee was classified as “terminated,” “seasonal layoff,” or “out of business” twelve months after becoming eligible
to contribute (one observation per employee with at least twelve months of administrative data). Similarly, monthly turnover equals one if the employee was
“active” in month t-1 but “terminated,” “seasonal layoff,” or “out of business” in month t (unit of observations is employee-month). Monthly after-tax earnings are
estimated at the employee-month level as total monthly contributions divided by current savings rate (e.g., $100 / 5% = $2,000). Monthly earnings can only be
estimated for the subset of contributors. We report the mean, median, and interquartile range. Finally, we report the within-employee standard deviation of monthly
earnings, calculated at the employee level using all months with positive contributions within each employee-employer pair. Source: Authors calculations.
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Table 3: OregonSaves Opt-Out Rates and Initial Account Balances by Industry

In this table, the unit of observation is employee i three months after the date on which the employee would be eligible to contribute to OregonSaves (where the
eligibility date is set under the assumptions that her identify is verified and she remains employed). We report the number of employees in column (1). The focus
on each employee during this particular month explains the reduced sample size relative to Tables 1 and 2. Column (2) reports the fraction of these employees who
have formally opted out of OregonSaves within three months of eligibility. Columns (3) and (4) condition the sample on having opted out and report the fraction
that list the reason for opting out as “I can't afford to save at this time” or “I have my own retirement plan,” respectively. Columns (5), (6), and (7) report the
fractions of all employees without an account (which includes the vast majority of employees who opt out), with an account balance of $0, or with a positive
account balance. The remaining columns focus on the subset of employees with positive account balances after three months of eligibility and report the mean,
median, and interquartile range of their account balance three months after being eligible. Source: Authors calculations.
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Table 4: Reasons for Formally Opting Out of OregonSaves

In this table, we summarize the reasons that employees give for formally opting out of OregonSaves. Employees who
opt out are presented with a list of seven reasons (“I can't afford to save at this time” through “I'm not satisfied with
the investment options”) and asked to choose one. Employees were also allowed to choose “Other” and fill out an
open response. Of the 31,284 employees who choose “Other.” 8,836 provide a comment. After classifying the 8,836
comments into narrow categories, we determined that 726 of the comments matched one of the seven prespecified
reasons. The most popular of the remaining 8,110 comments are summarized in the lower panel. Differences between
columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 and “I can't afford to save” and “I have my own retirement plan” in this table are driven
by the smaller sample size in Table 3 (which conditions on three months after the initial eligibility date). Source:
Authors calculations.
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Table 5: Predicting Opt Out from OregonSaves

In this table, we estimate linear probability models to predict opt out from OregonSaves. The unit of observation is
employee i. The dependent variable equals 100 if employee i has formally opted out of OregonSaves three months
after her initial eligibility date, and zero otherwise. Employee-level independent variables include age category
dummy variables (omitted category is ages 18-25); account holder location dummy variables (omitted category is
account holder lives in an urban Oregon zip code); OregonSaves job number 2 or 3+ dummy variables; and an
employee i terminated in or before month t dummy variable. Employer-level variables include firm size (natural
logarithm of the number of employees when enrolling) and dummy variables indicating whether the employer joined
OregonSaves during the pilot phase, whether the employer registered after the OregonSaves deadline based on firm
size, and whether the employer has processed payroll for at least one employee through month t. Industry-level
variables include median employee income within the industry in month t and standard deviation of employee income
within the industry in month t. Columns that controls for the average unemployment rate in the account holder’s
county over the prior three months are limited to employees living in Oregon and Washington. Column (4) includes
the fraction of employee i's coworkers that had formally opted out in month t-1. All columns include year-month fixed
effects. Columns (3) and (4) include industry fixed effects. Standard errors cluster on employer. Statistical significance
at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Source: Authors
calculations.
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Table 6: Predicting Positive Account Balances

In this table, we estimate linear probability models to predict positive OregonSaves account balances conditional on
not having formally opted out. The unit of observation is employee i. The dependent variable equals 100 if employee
i has a positive account balance three months after her initial eligibility date, and zero otherwise. Employee-level
independent variables include age category dummy variables (omitted category is ages 18-25); account holder location
dummy variables (omitted category is account holder lives in an urban Oregon zip code); OregonSaves job number 2
or 3+ dummy variables; and an employee i terminated in or before month t dummy variable. Employer-level
independent variables include firm size (natural logarithm of the number of employees when enrolling) and dummy
variables indicating whether the employer joined OregonSaves during the pilot phase, whether the employer registered
after the OregonSaves deadline based on firm size, and whether Industry-level independent variables include median
employee income within the industry in month t and the standard deviation of employee income within the industry
in month t. Column (1) includes the full sample of employees and includes the control for whether the employer has
processed payroll for at least on employee through month t; columns (2) through (4) includes only employees for
whom this variable equals one. Column (4) includes the fraction of employee i's coworkers that had a positive account
balance in month t-1. All columns include year-month fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) include industry fixed effects.
Standard errors cluster on employer. Statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent levels is
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Source: Authors calculations.
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Table 7: Distribution of OregonSaves Contribution Rates

In this table, we describe the distribution of OregonSaves contribution rates. In columns (1) and (2), we focus on the sample of employees three months after the
initial eligibility date, with one observation per employee. Because employees who opt out have a contribution rate of 0%, column (2) excludes employees who
have formally opted out. In columns (3) and (4), the unit of observation is employee-month. Column (3) focuses on the entire sample of employee-months while
column (4) focuses on employees who are active, eligible, have an open account, and have not formally opted out in month t. Source: Authors calculations.
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Table 8: Frequency of Monthly Changes in Contribution Rates among Active, Eligible Employees with Open Accounts

In this table, we provide evidence on persistence in contribution rates across months. Similar to column (4) of Table 7, the unit of observation is employee-month
and the sample is limited to employees who are active, eligible, have an open account, and have not formally opted out in month t-1. For each lagged contribution
rate, we report the number of employee-months with the current contribution rate, as well as the percent decreasing or increasing their contribution rate. Because
we combine all contribution rates greater than 7% into a single category, we do not report percentage increase within this row. Source: Authors calculations.
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Table 9: Growth of OregonSaves, August 2018 – April 2020

The sample is limited to open accounts in month t. We report the total number of dollars invested in OregonSaves at the end of each month, as well as the total net
flows (inflows minus outflows), inflows, and outflows during the month. Percent net flow is the net flow during month t scaled by total assets in month t-1. Percent
inflow and outflow are defined similarly. The “% Liquid Reserve” is the fraction of all OregonSaves assets invested in the State Street Institutional Liquid Reserve
Fund, the initial default investment option for each account. Source: Authors calculations.
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Table 10: Account-Level OregonSaves Summary Statistics by Month, August 2018 – April 2020

The sample is limited to open accounts in month t. The unit of observation is the account of participant i. We report the number of open accounts, the number of
open accounts with a positive balance at the end of month t, the average account balance at the end of month t (excluding zeros), the fraction of accounts with any
inflow, any outflow, or both an inflow and an outflow during month t, the average net flow, inflow, and outflow during month t (excluding zeros), and the average
fraction of account balances invested in the State Street Institutional Liquid Reserve Fund, the default investment option for the first $1,000 in OregonSaves
contributions. Source: Authors calculations.
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Table 11: Evolution of Account Balances Based on Employee Status

In this table, the unit of observation is account i in month t. We limit the sample to accounts for which the first contribution is August 2018 or later (which explains
why the number of open accounts in the first column is less than 70,077). We begin following an account when it makes its first contribution into OregonSaves
and then track the account forward up to 18 months. Because the number of OregonSaves participants is growing over time, we necessarily have fewer observations
as we move from month t of the initial contribution to month t+17. The fraction of participants classified by (one or more of their employers) as active at the end
of month t falls from 96.8% to 61.5%. We report account statistics separately for active and inactive employees. For example, 11 months after their initial
contribution into OregonSaves there are 16,508 OregonSaves participants classified as active (at one or more employers) and 7,109 classified as inactive. We report
the fraction of open accounts with positive balances, with any inflows during the month, with any outflows during the month, and average balance at the end of the
month (including zeros). Source: Authors calculations.
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Table 12: Employee Status and Average OregonSaves Account Balance

In this table, the unit of observation is account i in month t. As in Table 11, we limit the sample to accounts for which the first contribution is August 2018 or later.
We begin following an account when it makes its first contribution into OregonSaves and then track the account forward up to 18 months. Each month, we report
the fraction of participants classified by (one or more of their employers) as active at the end of month t and the average account balance, separately by age range.
Source: Authors calculations.
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Table 13: Predicting Any Monthly Inflows and Outflows

In this table, we estimate linear probability models to predict any monthly inflows and outflows. The unit of
observation is the account of employee i in month t. We limit the sample to accounts for which the first contribution
is August 2018 or later. The dependent variable in column (1) equals 100 if there is any inflow into the account in
month t, and zero otherwise. Similarly, the dependent variable in column (2) equals 100 if there is any outflow from
the account in month t, and zero otherwise. We include dummy variables to capture whether the employee is listed as
being actively employed, whether they were terminated during month t (which reflect either a formal opt out decision
or a direct change to the saving rate). We include age category fixed effects (omitted category is ages 18-25); months
since the initial contribution fixed effects; date fixed effects; and industry fixed effects. Standard errors cluster on
employer. Statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5- percent, and 10-percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *,
respectively. Source: Authors calculations.
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Online Appendix Table 1: Coverage of Pension Plans and IRAs among SIPP Survey
Respondents

In this table, we show the fraction of individuals that having a pension plan or an IRA in the sample of the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Data come from the 2014 Social Security Administration Supplement Data,
which is part of the 2014 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Panel A shows the percent of SIPP
survey respondents not included in an employment-based pension plan. Pension Plans include defined-benefit plans,
401(k)s, and 403(b)s. About 30% of SIPP respondents did not have access to an employment-based pension plan in
2014. Panel B presents, of all workers without access to an employment-based pension plan, 7.5% of workers had an
IRA and were actively contributing to their IRA account. Another 14.5% of workers had an IRA but were not actively
contributing. About 78% of workers did not have a pension plan or an IRA. Panel C compares selected socioeconomic
characteristics between workers covered by OregonSaves and SIPP respondents not included in a pension plan. The
average age for both groups is 37. Average monthly earnings are $2,887 (before-tax) for OregonSaves workers and
$2,933 (before-tax) for SIPP respondents lacking access to a pension plan. Pre-tax earnings for OregonSaves workers
are computed using the after-tax earnings imputed from the OregonSaves data, the marginal federal tax rate in 2019,
and the marginal state tax rate in Oregon in 2019. Monthly earnings are more volatile for OregonSaves workers than
SIPP respondents. Following the previous literature summarized in Hannagan and Morduch (2015), we calculate
income volatility as the standard deviation of monthly earnings divided by average monthly earnings. Previous studies
found that the income volatility measure is usually between 0.15 and 0.45. To calculate the income volatility for
OregonSaves workers who still participated in the OS program in April 2020, we use their imputed monthly earnings
records in 2019 to minimize the impact of the COVID-19 on income volatility in 2020. For SIPP respondents, we use
their monthly earnings in 2014 reported in the SIPP survey. Source: Authors calculations.
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Online Appendix Table 2: OregonSaves Opt-Out Rates Over Time

In this table, the unit of observation is employee i in the initial month in which the employee would be eligible to
contribute into OregonSaves (where the eligibility date is set under the assumptions that her identify is verified and
she remains employed) and over the following twelve months. We report opt out rates for the full sample of employees
for whom we possess data in month t, and separately for employees for whom accounts were and were not opened.
Differences across account status reflect the fact that formally opting out of OregonSaves reduces the likelihood that
an account is ever opened. Note that the 40.9% overall opt out rate in month three matches the full-sample rate in the
bottom row of Table 3. Source: Authors calculations.
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Online Appendix Table 3: OregonSaves Opt-Out Rates by Month

In this table, the unit of observation is employee i three months after the data on which the employee would be eligible
to contribute into OregonSaves (under the assumptions that she has her identify verified and remains employed). We
exclude employees who become eligible before July 2018 (because we lack data on the timing of opt out before August
2018) or after January 2020 (because the administrative data end in April 2020). We exclude the small number of
employees for whom an eligibility date is missing (typically because the employer is classified as “Exempt”). We do
not condition on the employee being classified as active or having an open account. Note that the 40.9% overall opt
out rate matches the rate in the bottom row of Table 3. Source: Authors calculations; see text.
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Online Appendix Table 4: Likelihood of Increasing or Decreasing Contribution Rate, by
Month

In this table, we report the fractions of employees who have not formally opted out of OregonSaves in month t-1 that
(a) increase their contribution rate in month t, decrease their contribution rate in month t without formally opting out,
and decreasing their contribution rate in month t by formally opting out. We do not impose any other filters on the
sample. Because our contribution rate date begins in August 2018, the first month for which we can measure changes
is September 2018. The vast majority of the increases in January 2019 and January 2020 are due to automatic
escalation. Source: Authors calculations; see text.
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Online Appendix Table 5: Aggregate Asset Allocation Snapshots, August 2018 – April 2020

In this table, we report the aggregate number of dollars invested in each investment option on four different dates: August 2018, December 2018, December 2019,
and April 2020. The State Street Target Retirement 2015 Fund merged into State Street Target Retirement Fund during March 2020. The State Street Target
Retirement 2070 Fund was added during April 2020. Source: Authors calculations; see text.
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Online Appendix Table 6: Fund Returns and Flows, August 2018 – April 2020

In this table, we report summary statistics for the investment options available through OregonSaves. The unit of observation is fund i in month t and the sample
is limited to the period August 2018 to April 2020. The outflows from the State Street Institutional Liquid Reserve Fund in February 2020 are driven by exchanges
into the target retirement funds. The State Street Target Retirement 2015 Fund merged into State Street Target Retirement Fund during March 2020. The State
Street Target Retirement 2070 Fund was added during April 2020. Source: Authors calculations; see text.
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Online Appendix Table 7: Dispersion of OregonSaves Account Balances Based on Employee Status

In this table, the unit of observation is account i in month t. We limit the sample to accounts for which the first contribution is August 2018 or later (which explains
why the number of open accounts in the first column is less than 70,077). We begin following an account when it makes its first contribution into OregonSaves
and then track the account forward up to 18 months. Because the number of OregonSaves participants is growing over time, we necessarily have fewer observations
as we move from month t of the initial contribution to month t+17. The fraction of participants classified by (one or more of their employers) as active at the end
of month t falls from 96.8% to 61.5%. We report the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of OregonSaves account balance separately for active and inactive
employees. Source: Authors calculations; see text.

